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the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the European Union, 
and the US. In contrast to conventional views opposing the American system to 
the ISO/European framework, the paper argues that institutional developments 
of service standards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises reflecting 
contrasting models of standardization, not only between, but also across, those 
systems. While this undermines the conventional analysis of a transatlantic 
divide in standardization, it also shows that the variance between product and 
service standards is much greater in the European context and the ISO system 
than in the US, where it is hardly debated.
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1  Introduction
This paper explores the variety of institutional environments in which standards 
for the service sector are expected to support the rise of a global knowledge-based 
economy. It analyzes, on a cross-institutional basis, multiple patterns of author-
ity setting standards in the context of the International Organization for Stand-
ardization (ISO), the European Union and the US. The establishment of the World 
Trade Organization (WTO) in 1995 gave international standards a major role in 
harmonizing technical specifications of goods and services in the global market. 
While standards supposedly lead to greater rationality and coherence in distinct 
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industries and services, all of them give rise to on-going struggles in complex con-
figurations of power involving multiple actors including multinational corpora-
tions, organized interests, and state regulators. In other words, standards benefit 
from massive transfers of authority to bodies situated between the political and 
the economic spheres, serving as alternatives to conventional state regulation.
An initial question, then, is: who is in charge of defining such standards, and 
more specifically, how do distinct institutional environments affect the develop-
ment of standards likely to support the internationalization of services? A second 
question is: how distinct are the multiple authorities of standards in the domain 
of services? Many services are generally described as intrinsically resisting relo-
cation because of their intangibility and their involvement in activities suppos-
ing a co-production between producers and customers.1 Service standards would, 
therefore, be considered a special case of standardization. The few studies specif-
ically focused on the role of international standards in the service sector share the 
assumption that, although they appeared only very recently, they are expected to 
surge in parallel with the importance of services in the economy and society at 
large, with growing reliance on standards in a context of regulatory reform and a 
more intense internationalization of the sector.2 As emphasized by high-ranking 
officials of standardization bodies “one of [the] biggest challenges is precisely 
how to address the service sector.”3
Studies on standardization regularly stress the fundamental differences 
between, on the one hand, the ISO and the European environment and, on the 
other hand, the American institutional framework for setting standards. Insti-
tutional analyses present the two systems as a case of “regulatory competition” 
where domestic institutional complementarities play a key role.4 While shared 
commitments towards openness, transparency, voluntary participation and 
consensus building maintain institutional isomorphism in standards-setting 
organizations,5 comparative perspectives highlight the tension between the ISO/
European and American systems as reflecting the dichotomy between coordi-
nated and liberal market economies. The former favors a coordinated standard-
ization system with greater reliance on territorially-based legitimacy and state 
oversight; the latter gives preference to competing sources of standards and relies 
on market mechanisms to ensure their definition and adoption. From this stand-
point, future developments of service standards are more likely to depend on 
1 Dossani and Kenney (2007); du Tertre (2013).
2 Blind (2003); ISO (2006); Graz and Niang (2013).
3 Authors’ interview with Alan Bryden, Secretary General of the ISO, Geneva, 8 June 2007.
4 Czaya and Hesser (2001); Tate (2001); Werle (2001); Mattli and Büthe (2003); Winn (2009).
5 DiMaggio and Powell (1983); Schmidt and Werle (1998: p. 58).
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divergent national institutional frameworks than service sector specificity. Insti-
tutional analyses on framework conditions differentiating the ISO/European and 
American setting entail implicit or explicit normative claims about a good stand-
ardization system; they also tend to reify differences between the models. As 
Egyedi emphasized, conventional approaches are inclined to underestimate the 
opening of most industry consortia setting standards outside formal institutional 
environments and overestimate the practical implications of democratic proce-
dures within formal organizations.6 A more historical perspective underlines the 
complementarities between regulation and free trade and the role of standardi-
zation in the construction of the US and EU internal markets.7 This prompts us 
to analyze the connections specific to the service sector between the freedom of 
private actors to set technical specifications within a market economy and the 
political environment of the institutional framework required to ensure some 
order to these multiple practices on a transnational basis.
Understanding how institutional settings affect the development of 
service standards requires us to bring together more systematically the plural-
ity of actors defining the standards, the distinctiveness of services concerned 
by standardization, and the transnational space in which such standards are 
likely to be recognized and implemented. To this end, the paper relies on global 
political economy approaches that uncover the power relations underpinning 
various forms of standards supporting a deeper integration of the market for ser-
vices. From this standpoint, the process of globalization does not oppose states 
and markets: it is a joint expression, and includes new patterns and agents of 
structural change through formal and informal power and regulatory practices. 
Service standards are thus viewed as heterogeneous and reflecting distinct forms 
of transnational hybrid authority. They blur the distinction between private and 
public actors in charge of setting rules; their scope spans a continuum bring-
ing together physical measures and societal values; moreover, they reinforce the 
deterritorialization of regulatory practices in contemporary capitalism. In con-
trast to conventional views opposing the American system to the ISO/European 
framework, the paper argues that institutional developments of service stand-
ards are likely to face trade-offs and compromises reflecting contrasting models 
of standardization, not only between, but also across, those systems. While this 
undermines the conventional analysis of a transatlantic divide in standardiza-
tion, it also shows that the variance between product and service standards is 
much greater in the European context and the ISO system than in the US, where 
it is hardly debated.
6 Egyedi (2005).
7 Egan (2001).
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Critical discourse analysis of a wide range of data collected from interviews 
with high-ranking officials and published documents allows us to characterize 
the multiple authorities of service standards along the analytical dimensions 
underlying transnational hybrid authority. This paper is arranged as follows. 
The first section provides background on the internationalization of services, 
the institutional environment of standardization, and methodology. The second 
section reviews the literature on international standards with a distinct focus on 
the transatlantic divide and the case of services. The third section presents our 
theoretical framework. Sections 4, 5 and 6 present our findings, which are dis-
cussed in Section 7. We conclude by summarizing our results and raising some 
limitations and future research questions.
2  Some backgroud
2.1  Services
The dominance of services is one of the most striking aspects of changes in 
the world economy over recent decades. Today, services account for around 
75% of all jobs and GDP in OECD economies – and over 50% in developing 
countries and emerging economies.8 The significance of services goes beyond 
their growing share in the economy and close connection to technology and 
knowledge. It is also intimately related to an expected surge in their interna-
tionalization resulting from durable regulatory reforms. An institutional envi-
ronment enabling the internationalization of services has gradually emerged 
with the application of the General Agreement on Trade in Services (GATS) in 
1995, negotiations underway at the World Trade Organization (WTO) and the 
adoption in 2006 of a new EU directive (2006/123/EC) on services in the inter-
nal market. Yet, total trade in services has remained somewhat unaffected for 
the last two decades, as it continues to represent around 25% of world trade. 
The only significant shift relates to the distribution between developed and 
developing countries. During the same period, developing countries have 
almost doubled their share in the world trade in services to reach more than 
30% in 2010.9 While the level of non-tariff measures can explain the stabil-
ity of trade in services for developed countries to some extent, the increased 
market access for developing countries and recent revisions in statistics based 
8 Statistics, available from http://unctadstat.unctad.org/. Accessed 26 November 2013.
9 Ibid.
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on value added trade indicating much larger figures for trade in services, calls 
for further explanation.
Existing studies lend support to the contention that the service sector is dis-
tinctive. While acknowledging a great diversity of activities between and within 
sectors, the relational and immaterial dimension of services and considerable 
regulatory diversity across countries are seen as major hindrances to the inter-
nationalization and standardization of services.10 In a context where manufac-
turing can no longer be envisaged independently of all the supporting services 
at either end of the production chain, it is important, however, to mitigate the 
argument of a so-called service distinctiveness. As Bodes and Miles emphasize, 
“the service economy is not merely an economy in which service sectors are 
quantitatively dominant. It is one where ‘service’ is becoming a guiding princi-
ple throughout the economy.”11 This supposes that a solution to the lack of face-
to-face contact between providers and users of services can be found. It is in this 
respect that the rise of a service economy has created a demand for standardiza-
tion involving the gradual breaking down of a complex service provision into a 
set of clearly and distinctly identifiable procedures. As the delivery of services 
becomes increasingly integrated and fragmented, the need to codify the various 
production processes and expectations of beneficiaries on the basis of formal 
criteria also intensifies. According to Blind, it is precisely “because of the intan-
gible nature of services and the information asymmetries thus caused between 
management and service provider, [that] the need to introduce quality standards 
for each stage of the service production is especially high.”12 In contrast to a 
micro-economic view of standards seen as a means of lessening the uncertainty 
in quality and security, standards dedicated to the provision of services on a 
transborder basis respond to conflicting understandings of quality and security 
uncertainties. They can promote minimal market rules, but they can also include 
provisions with the aim of reinforcing socially- or environmentally-based spec-
ifications in the delivery and usage of services. As Callon and his co-authors 
point out, qualifying products in a service economy is likely to provoke “a pro-
found transformation of the rules governing the workings of markets...Market 
organization becomes a collective issue, and the economy (once again) acquires 
a political dimension.”13 This prompts us to briefly outline the institutional envi-
ronment of standardization.
10 Bryson and Daniels (2007); World Trade Organization (2012); du Tertre (2013).
11 Boden and Miles (2000: p. 258).
12 Blind (2004: p. 167).
13 Callon, Méadel, and Rabeharisoa (2002: pp. 197–207).
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2.2  Standardization
In the past, technical specifications were largely the preserve of the regula-
tory framework of law, company standards set by managers and, to a marginal 
degree, national standards institutions. Today, the regulatory framework of law 
has yielded ground to voluntary standards drafted by a raft of international or 
regional public and private sector bodies. The creation of the WTO in 1995 was a 
crucial threshold. Unlike the GATT, whose provisions in terms of technical regu-
lations were not very restrictive, the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade 
(TBT), the Agreement on Government Procurement (GPA), the review of the Agree-
ment on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) and the General Agreement 
on Trade in Services (GATS) grant international standards a major role in the 
harmonization of technical specifications applicable to goods and services. State 
regulation in this domain must comply with “legitimate objectives.” With regard 
to goods, such concerns are related to health, safety and environmental issues. 
In contrast, as we have seen, conflicting understandings of market uncertainties 
about quality and security are the major issues in the sphere of services; they 
encompass a wide range of expectations regarding, in particular, competence 
and professional skills, the capacity to deliver and business continuity, data pro-
tection and privacy, and consumer protection and information, as well as larger 
societal and environmental concerns. As the WTO is not a standard-setting body, 
its promotion of regulatory convergence is made by prompting its members to use 
international standards. GATS article VI:4 thus assigns to the Council for Trade 
and Services (through its Working Party on Domestic Regulation) the largely mar-
ket-inspired task of developing “any necessary discipline” to ensure that regula-
tion by states is not “more burdensome than necessary to ensure the quality of 
the services.” Article VI: 5b specifies that in this respect, “account shall be taken 
of international standards of relevant international organizations.” The WTO 
considers in this regard that cooperation in regulation affecting trade in services 
would have much to gain from improving “regulators’ understanding of, and con-
fidence in, standards and requirements with which they may not be familiar.”14 
Yet, existing provisions still grant a wide range of international bodies the ability 
to define standards affecting the internationalization of services. The study of the 
ISO, European and American institutional settings for service standards is closely 
related to the plurality of international standards in this context and thus to the 
ability of different models to promote their standards at an international level.
In the US, standardization is usually presented as fragmented and organ-
ized on a sectoral basis. A variety of competing standards organizations (formal 
14 World Trade Organization (2012: p. 186).
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and informal) set market driven standards exempt from state intervention. The 
system follows a so-called model of direct participation, where companies have 
direct access to standard-setting activities with international claims. In contrast, 
the European standardization system is coordinated and centralized, and oper-
ates under a higher degree of government control. The European standardiza-
tion bodies15 and the ISO all follow a so-called model of national participation 
where a national body holds the voting rights within the international or regional 
standardization bodies such as the ISO, the International Electrotechnical Com-
mission (IEC) and the CEN. In spite of their differences, the European and Ameri-
can standardization systems have common characteristics. Both rely on private 
organizations to shape standards on a voluntary basis. They follow a due process 
open to all interested parties and their deliberations are based on the “state of 
the art.” The draft standards are subject to public consultation and the general 
interest is supposed to prevail over particular interests. Finally, their standard-
setting bodies recognize the primacy of international standards, even though the 
understanding of what “international” means remains controversial.
Despite these similarities, several conflicts remain between ISO/European 
and American standards developing organizations (SDOs).16 From the American 
point of view, the national participation model in the European standardization 
bodies gives them a substantial advantage at the international level.17 The Vienna 
and Dresden agreements between the ISO and CEN, respectively between the 
International Electrotechnical Commission (IEC) and the European Committee 
for Electrotechnical Standardization (CENELEC), can indeed be seen as benefit-
ing European actors, as they grant provisions for the adoption of European stand-
ards as international ones and have ensured a coordination of the standardization 
work between those organizations. Moreover, the European New Approach sets 
up technical barriers to American firms through the distinct role it grants to the 
European standardization bodies. From a European point of view, the decentral-
ized and fragmented standard setting procedures in the US represent a barrier 
to the US market. Moreover, American SDOs’ claims to serve the public interest 
often hinder strong commercial interests and contending regulatory competi-
tion. Finally, the international reach of standards developed in the US tends to 
15 The three European standardization bodies are: the CEN, the Comité Européen de Normali-
sation Electrotechnique (CENELEC) and the European Telecommunications Standards Institute 
(ETSI). The ETSI differs significantly from the CEN and CENELEC in that it accepts corporate 
as well as national members. For further analysis of the European context, see: Egan (2001); 
 Schoechle (2009: p. 24).
16 See for instance: Egan (2001); Schepel (2005); Büthe and Mattli (2011).
17 Zuckerman (1999: p. 40); Czaya and Hesser (2001: p. 32).
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undermine the authority of formal standardization arenas such as the ISO and 
CEN. Unsurprisingly, scholars have discussed such transatlantic divergences on 
the most appropriate institutional foundation of international standards at great 
length.18
2.3  Methods
In order to study the multiple authorities of service standards, sources were col-
lected on a non-random and purposive basis, thus allowing for the inclusion of 
major standard-setting organizations and actors active in international standard-
ization but limiting out-of-sample generalization.19 Sources include interviews 
with international experts and high-ranking officials,20 policy documents, reports 
and official data related to American, European and ISO standardization system.
The sources were analyzed according to the three dimensions underlying 
transnational hybrid authority: the actors defining standards; the objects con-
cerned by technical specifications likely to emphasize the distinctiveness of 
service standards; and the space in which international standards for the service 
sector can be applied and recognized by various actors. In order to study the pub-
lic-private relationships underpinning standardization activities, high-ranking 
officials of major international, European and American standard-setting organi-
zations were interviewed to understand their own representation and relations 
with other standardization organizations and governmental agencies. In addi-
tion, the main regulatory policies on either side of the Atlantic were analyzed to 
identify the role attributed to various agents involved in the field. Interviewees 
were also asked about the activities they conduct in the field of services stand-
ardization, and their opinion and strategies regarding hindrances and opportu-
nities for developing service standards. While their answers provided rich and 
various perceptions of the distinctiveness of service standards, the analysis also 
reviews what can be standardized by examining policy developments related to 
18 Tate (2001); Mattli and Büthe (2003); Winn (2009).
19 Small (2009).
20 High-ranking officials interviewed belong to all the major bodies concerned in the interna-
tional, American and European context of standardization: the American National Standard In-
stitute (ANSI); the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Society for 
Testing and Materials (ASTM international), the National Institute of Standards and Technology 
(NIST), the Consumer Electronics Association (CEA), the Consumer Specialty Products Associa-
tion (CPSA), the International Organization for Standardization (ISO), the Comité Européen de 
Normalisation (CEN), the Association Française de Normalisation (AFNOR), the British Stand-
ards Institution (BSI), and the Deutsches Institut für Normung (DIN).
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service standards, such as the ISO procedures and decisions related to the service 
sector, the European Commission mandates in the field of services standardiza-
tion, as well as the recent reform of the European standardization system. Finally, 
the space in which service standards are likely to be recognized is pinpointed by 
paying closer attention to the existing features of the European and American 
internal markets, their respective reliance on an exogenous process of market 
mechanisms and on an endogenous logic of territorial sovereignty and the poten-
tial trade-off within and across standardization systems.
Critical discourse analysis of our interviews and collected documents reveals 
that both are situated within and constrained by particular social and cultural 
contexts.21 They induce constitutive effects by creating what they refer to, and by 
legitimizing specific understandings of the most appropriate institutionalization 
of international standards. As such, discourses and documents reflect emerging 
patterns of authority for standard-setting practices as well as justifications for 
extending such patterns to the development of service standards.
3  Review of the literature
Scholarship on standards is largely dominated by business, economic, and applied 
science studies with a focus on industrial choices, market failures, and techno-
logical innovation and competition.22 Econometric studies have now spread to 
assessing standards as a public good to be measured according to defined social 
and economic benefits.23 With regard to services, standardization is generally 
viewed as a strategic innovation behavior of firms abandoning a more tailored 
customer-based approach, depending on their size, sector, and position in the 
life cycle of the services sold.24 While this scholarship overlooks standardization 
processes beyond the environment of the firm, the literature in history, sociol-
ogy and organization studies emphasizes how standards themselves constitute a 
significant social institution. Their strategic use by powerful actors can influence 
many aspects of modern life, including sexuality, scientific discoveries, animal 
welfare, and music downloads, as well as labor and democratic processes. In 
shedding light on the broad scope of standards in contemporary democratic soci-
21 Taylor (2001: pp. 8–9); Van Dijk (2001); Chiapello and Fairclough (2002).
22 Toth (1984); Cargill (1989); Drèze (1989); OECD (1999); Vries (1999); Swann (2000); Blind 
(2004).
23 Temple and Williams (2002); Blind and Jungmittag (2005); ISO (2010); Prakash and Potoski 
(2010).
24 Tether, Hipp, and Miles (2001); Sundbo (2002); Sako (2009); Djellal and Gallouj (2010).
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eties, they underline the ability of standards to constitute a distinct form of social 
regulation or technology of government in shaping bodies and subjectivities.25 As 
Timmermans and Epstein observe, “somewhere between glorified globalization 
and dark dehumanization, each standard achieves some small transformation of 
an existing social order.”26
From the perspective of political science, the drive for technical specifica-
tion and international standardization is understood as a distinct institutional 
framework with the power to ensure some order in market practices at the trans-
national level. Neo-institutional studies focus on the relations between private 
actors involved in standardization and the institutional environment in which 
their actions take place. Following the concept of transaction costs in institutional 
economics, agents’ practices are defined by their environment to a considerable 
extent. From this perspective, standardization provides an institutional guaran-
tee for improving trust in transactions and curbing free riding risks among actors 
not willing to pay the full cost of expected benefits. Rational choice and game 
theories formalize systematic explanations of cooperative games and conflicts of 
distribution in the institutional framework of standardization.27 In this view, the 
logic of action trumps its content, and the distinct case of services unsurprisingly 
gets scant attention – standardization is implicitly seen as inversely proportional 
to information asymmetries resulting from the intangible nature of services. 
Moreover, the understanding of the power relations involved in standardiza-
tion is confined to quantifiable and a priori defined criteria based on rationalist 
assumptions.
Sociological and historical institutionalist studies adopt a less formal ration-
alist approach to the socially and historically constructed framework of standardi-
zation and its diversity across the globe. They provide accounts of the institutional 
complementarities that facilitate the accommodation of the authority of stand-
ards set by multiple standard-setting organizations.28 In particular, such analyses 
shed light on the debate between the strongly institutionalized ISO and European 
systems, the more competitive pattern in the US, and the oligopolistic nature of 
consortia agreements.29 Comparing the role of standards in the unification of the 
contemporary European market and the construction of the US market in the 19th 
25 Loya and Boli (1999); Brunsson, Jacobsson, and Associates (2000); Tamm Hallström (2004); 
Higgins and Tamm Hallström (2007); Ruwet (2009); Loconto and Busch (2010); Timmermans and 
Epstein (2010); Busch (2011); Brunsson, Rasche, and Seidl (2012); Dobusch and Quack (2012).
26 Timmermans and Epstein (2010: p. 83).
27 Abbott and Snidal (2001); Spruyt (2001); Vogel (2009).
28 Schmidt and Werle (1998); Mattli and Büthe (2003); Büthe and Mattli (2011).
29 Egan (2001); Nicolaïdis and Egan (2001); Tate (2001).
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century, Egan highlights the complementarities between regulation and free trade 
and the role of standardization in achieving this goal: “While European and Amer-
ican businesses have both used the courts to circumvent trade restrictions, they 
have themselves been used by the federal government, which has frequently del-
egated regulatory responsibilities to industry experts involved in private standards 
bodies, industry and trade association and professional societies.”30 Moreover, as 
we have seen in the previous section, European and American standardization 
systems share what Czaya and Hesser call an “ethos” of standardization or in 
Werle’s words they display a strong “institutional isomorphism:”31 beyond insti-
tutional differences between the US and Europe, standardization is used in both 
cases as a tool for the construction of the internal market.
As compared to various strands of institutional analyses of the effectiveness 
of convergence or divergence in standardization processes, the so-called variety 
of capitalism approach provides a more substantial and in-depth understanding 
of the political economy shaping the multiple authorities of standards. From this 
standpoint, American and European standardization systems differ according 
to the distinction between a liberal market economy and a coordinated market 
economy. The tension surrounding international standardization reflects the per-
sistence of national differences related to the content of standards, their institu-
tional environment, and perceptions by business. As noted by Tate, “corporate 
strategies in liberal market economies treat standards as a proprietary good or 
service to be traded like any other. (…) Corporate strategies in coordinated market 
economies, by contrast, treat standards as an infrastructure for deeper coop-
eration.”32 As Winn further explores, viewing standards as either competitive or 
cooperative is likely to affect their legitimacy: “In the US, the legitimacy of the 
activities of SDOs, formal or informal, is generally perceived to be a function of 
resulting standards’ responsiveness to market conditions. Outside the US, the 
nature of the formal legal mandate to an SDO is generally perceived as pivotal in 
assessing the legitimacy of its work.”33 While Winn relates these two sources of 
legitimacy to the divide between consortia and de jure ICT standards, the oppo-
sition also pertains to the distinction between the European and ISO national 
delegation model and the American direct participation model. In short, a stand-
ard is likely to be recognized in the US in response to market transactions, while 
European and ISO standards are likely to embed standards’ market requirements 
into broader institutional concerns.
30 Egan (2001: p. 37).
31 See respectively: Czaya and Hesser (2001); Werle (2001).
32 Tate (2001: p. 472).
33 Winn (2009: p. 21).
124      Jean-Christophe Graz and Christophe Hauert
Drawing upon social constructivism, Egyedi questions such a clear-cut trans-
atlantic divide in standardization.34 She stresses that this tends to underestimate 
the opening of most industry consortia and overestimate the democratic institu-
tional pledge of formal organizations. While committees in both cases are formally 
open and work on a consensus-oriented basis, stakeholders with few resources, 
whether in civil society organizations or small and medium-sized enterprises, 
continue to take pains to participate in standard setting practices undertaken in 
technical committees. Thus, it is important to overcome the conventional carica-
tures opposing the American and ISO/European models. While different trajecto-
ries and national institutions do affect standards practices, and states do have an 
important role in this regard, comparative neo-institutional approaches tend to 
confine the practices of SDOs within the sovereign territory. Accordingly, they reify 
the concrete practices of SDOs, whose technical committees mostly rely on inputs 
from experts working for large firms with a transnational foothold. Moreover, 
they underestimate the involvement of US government agencies in the American 
system and overestimate the institutional embeddedness of formal SDOs. Making 
any a priori assumption about the role of public authorities in constructing the 
authority of standards is of little use overall, as it depends on institutional varia-
tion regarding the political economy of state market relations as much as on pref-
erences regarding the issues concerned.35 This is noteworthy with services, which 
can be highly technical, but at the same time embody contentious political inter-
ests and societal values. For instance, all sorts of standards related to information 
and communication technologies are used in services related to the development 
of smart global cities for improving transportation, energy efficiency, sustainable 
planning, and so on, but none of them would be of much use if left in a regulatory 
vacuum. More generally, the multiplicity of standards surrounding our everyday 
life has an influence on our health and safety, regardless of their place in regula-
tion. Therefore, the inclusiveness of standard-setting processes remains an issue 
whose significance lies beyond regulatory public policies. The analysis of stand-
ardization requires moving beyond conventional dichotomies: “Standards hover 
between state and the market; standards largely collapse the distinction between 
legal and social norms; standards are very rarely either wholly public or wholly 
private, and can be both intensely local and irreducibly global. (…) standards can 
be seen as links between these spheres and institutions.”36
The distinct practices of standardization call to mind the nébuleuse that Cox 
portrayed in the mixture of official and unofficial networks, with representatives 
34 Egyedi (2005).
35 Dudouet, Mercier, and Vion (2006: p. 389).
36 Schepel (2005: p. 4).
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of business, the state and academia working towards the formulation of a con-
sensual policy for global capitalism.37 Such structural power of standardization 
epitomizes the new forms of non-state authority that have evolved over the past 
decade in the global political economy. The scope of international standards per-
tains not only to their potential worldwide reach, but also to the broader organi-
zation of the capitalist system.38 Consequently, assessments of the relationship 
between multiple standard-setting agencies and society as a whole are bound 
to be controversial. This is all the more so with regard to services if one takes 
into account the deep cultural and societal values, as well as the elusive labor 
issues involved in activities supposing a co-production between producers and 
customers. Moreover, with the advancement of deregulation and liberalization 
and privatization, new service standards are likely to compete with previous 
rules governing pubic utilities, and more generally the social foundations of state 
power. The authority conferred on standard-setters by state agencies may narrow 
down the conventional Weberian view of state autonomy. This prompts us to elab-
orate further on how the co-existence of a wide range of standards reflects the rise 
of multiple non-state authorities in the global political economy.
4  The transnational hybrid authority of standards
Non-state actors lead to new forms of power in international relations. The lit-
erature on the rise of non-state actors, private authority and less conventional 
forms of sovereignty and governance has mushroomed over the last decade. A 
shared assumption of this scholarship, whatever its theoretical positions, is that 
at least two conditions must be met for such new forms of power to be effective: 
the consent of actors subject to the rules without having been involved in their 
making; and an explicit or implicit recognition by the state.39 For instance, Inter-
net users have not formally delegated their sovereign rights when they consent 
to rules set within a global institutional architecture mingling intergovernmen-
tal organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) with 
private bodies such as the Internet Corporation for Assigned Names and Numbers 
(ICANN).40 As emphasized by Graz and Nölke, “while there may be sharp dis-
37 Cox (1992).
38 Murphy (1994); Murphy and Yates (2009).
39 See in particular: Cutler, Haufler, and Porter (1999); Higgott, Underhill, and Bieler (1999); 
Hall and Bierstecker (2002); Schirm (2004); Grande and Pauly (2005); Djelic and Sahlin-Anders-
son (2006); Graz and Nölke (2008); Krause Hansen (2008); Büthe (2010).
40 Radu, Chenou, and Weber (2013).
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agreements as to the sense attributed to state recognition, there is little disagree-
ment concerning the overall complementary and subsidiary role taken by private 
actors in regard to State functions.”41 A critical source of non-state authority in the 
global political economy is therefore what Sassen calls “denationalization,” i.e., 
the process which contributes to the endogenization of private and transnational 
agendas within the political public sphere.42 Governments and intergovernmen-
tal institutions often support and fully recognize the power of non-state actors, 
who in turn may gain legitimate authority. The territorial basis of politics, of the 
state, and of the structural power of governments and markets still exists beyond 
various forms of transnational private governance highlighting serious obstacles 
on issues of substance and procedures. Standards are likely to generate insights 
into the analytical foundations of such new forms of transnational authority. As 
highlighted by Tamm Hallström and Boström, the authority of standards recog-
nized as legitimate remains fragile and full of pitfalls.43 We turn now to the core 
dimensions of international standards’ authorities.
The nature and implications of the rise of non-state actors as standard-set-
ting authorities shaping the global political economy calls for aggregating three 
distinct categories: the actors – i.e., who has the authority to set standards; the 
objects – i.e., what is standardized; and the space – i.e., where and whence stand-
ards are implemented. These three categories at best only capture some aspects of 
a complex and multifaceted process evolving extremely rapidly. Nonetheless, they 
try to point towards the significance of new forms of power in our societies and to 
move the analysis beyond the dichotomies underpinning most conceptual frame-
works opposing European and American institutional settings, as well as product 
and service standards. The multiple authorities of standards entail numerous 
agents who play or claim to play a role not only as new actors, but also in defin-
ing the nature of objects and the spatial structure in which they exert their power. 
These three categories (actors, objects, space) draw upon previous attempts to 
conceptualize hybrid forms of authority in the context of globalization.44 Interna-
tional standards simultaneously relate to the private sphere of economic activities 
governed by market constraints and to the public sphere of political action in the 
general interest of society. The objects of international standardization and space 
of its recognition are, thus, bound to be controversial. Services can be viewed as a 
distinct case in this regard as expectations regarding quality, security and capac-
ity to deliver are deeply imbedded in societal values and face regulatory diversity 
41 Graz and Nölke (2008: p. 12).
42 Sassen (2003); Sassen (2006).
43 Tamm Hallström and Boström (2010).
44 Graz (2006a,b).
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across countries. Together, these three dimensions have some resemblance to the 
tripartite standards regime conceptualized by Loconto and Busch.45 They provide 
a comprehensive yet differentiated picture of the wide range of actors involved in 
setting standards, the width of issues concerned and the deterritorialization of 
sovereignty conveyed by the multiple systems of certification and accreditation 
worldwide. In the context of our analysis, this can be understood as the trans-
national hybrid authority of standards. We examine those three dimensions in 
more detail hereafter.
The first dimension concerns the actors involved in defining standards and 
the distinction between the private and public spheres in which they operate. 
Market mechanisms and policy choices both affect the agents involved in the 
field, but in various ways, which can be seen as located on an institutional contin-
uum defining who can standardize. Technical specifications belong to the private 
sphere of economic activities governed by market constraints and affect social 
and technological change from that angle. Nevertheless they remain related to 
the public sphere of political action directed to the general interest of society – for 
instance by determining a certain level of risk or by setting principles of liability. 
Hence, even in the circumscribed field of technical specification, norms relate 
as much to capital accumulation and technical progress as to social improve-
ment or various instruments of the welfare state. When mandatory, enforceable 
and general, technical specifications become part of public law and enjoy the 
status of government regulation. While some environmental, health and safety 
performances are defined under such procedures, these are often established on 
a voluntary basis and are more specific in scope. In such cases, technical speci-
fications involve standard-setting bodies, whose private or public statutes vary 
considerably from one country to another. The wide range of actors and stand-
ardization bodies able to set international standards are likely to address the dis-
tinctive aspects of the service sector in various ways. This is precisely what is at 
stake in understanding what can be standardized.
The second dimension shaping international standardization relates to the 
objects concerned by technical specifications. Whereas the private/public nexus 
of the actors involved in setting standards can be located on an institutional 
continuum, this second dimension maps out a material continuum delineat-
ing what can be standardized. In aggregating the relationship between human 
beings and nature, technical specifications range from natural and invariable 
45 The regime includes standards-setting, accreditation, and certification – three processes that 
“traverse and integrate public and private spheres both within and across nations” (Loconto and 
Busch 2010; p. 508).
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physical measures to constructed and historically bound societal values. This 
dimension highlights the extension of the scope of international standardiza-
tion. If standards were initially confined to “physical” standards like screw 
threads, they are now covering more “societal” topics. Corporate social respon-
sibility standards, quality and environmental management system standards are 
emblematic in this regard. Applied to the standardization of services, this aspect 
raises questions about what is a service standard. The internationalization of the 
service sector depends on standards for the development of technical interfaces 
to industrialize the provision of services, as well as for the promotion of shared 
cultural values involved in the relationship of co-production between producers 
and consumers. Service standards can follow various paths in addressing such 
relationships, whether on a sectoral basis, taking deep cultural and societal 
values into account, or on a generic and horizontal basis, reflecting stereotyped 
behaviors that deny cultural and elusive labor issues involved in co-production 
activities. In other words, do service standards concern the material support 
enabling the delivery of services (protective equipment used in leisure sector, 
IT interface of call center, etc.)? Do they concern mere procedural and generic 
aspects of services irrespective of the cultural context of their provision (e.g., 
billing, complaint redress, information provision, security requirements in the 
domain of business processes continuity)? Are they able to take into account 
more substantial expectations related to cultural and societal values, as well 
as labor processes including implicit skills embedded in the co-production of 
intangible and relational services (special needs for disabled people, elderly 
and children, or customer-oriented behavior specifications for employees in 
tourism)? While those specifications can be defined on a voluntary or manda-
tory basis on a national plane, if included in international standards, they need 
recognition beyond state borders.
Our third dimension is the space on which technical specifications can be 
defined, diffused and recognized among sovereign states. While international 
standardization is driven by the attempt to homogenize specifications across 
national jurisdictions, processes of standards recognition allow for the accept-
ance of a plurality of standards or means of assessing conformity with them. 
Standardization thus occupies the cracks between the principle of exclusive-
ness of territorial sovereignty and the inclusiveness of rules governing the global 
economy. In order to understand this issue, we need to distinguish between exog-
enous and endogenous principles of standards recognition. The endogenous 
principle is related to a process of standard diffusion that is linked to the prin-
ciple of territorial sovereignty (i.e., what makes an international standard is that 
its development process is based on territorial sovereignty principle). Conversely, 
the exogenous principle is related to the diffusion of standards through market 
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mechanisms (i.e., what makes an international standard is its use by market 
actors across the globe).
To sum up, a prominent feature of globalization is the growing significance of 
services in the rise of a worldwide knowledge-based economy. This shift involves 
new patterns and agents of change through formal and informal regulatory prac-
tices of a wide range of non-state actors. Among them, service standards are 
likely to play a crucial role as they reflect a form of transnational hybrid authority 
whose scope extends from physical measures to societal values, blurs the distinc-
tion between private and public actors, and reinforces the deterritorialization of 
regulatory practices in contemporary capitalism. It is within this analytical frame-
work that the remainder of the paper will provide an overview of developments in 
the field of service standardization in the activities of formal SDOs within the ISO 
environment, the European Union, and the US.
5  The ISO setting
The ISO is a major arena for assessing current developments of service standardi-
zation. As the world’s largest developer and publisher of international standards 
with a membership of 164 mixed private and public national standardization 
bodies, the ISO represents the wide range of public and private actors involved in 
services standardization. The move into standardization of services began in 1995 
with a Consumer Policy Committee (COPOLCO) workshop in Beijing. Lawrence 
D. Eicher, then ISO Secretary General, emphasized that manufacturing industry 
was already changing with the move into generic management system standards 
and, from there on, “the emphasis could change even more to take into account 
the needs of the burgeoning service industries.”46 Six workshops were held in 
the following years with various foci, such as tourism, exhibition management, 
banking and insurance, and engineering consultancy, as well as multi-sectoral 
methodological issues for developing service standards. In 2001, a new working 
group was established to draft a guide on the use and development of service 
standards from a consumers’ perspective (ISO/IEC Guide 76:2008, Development 
of Service Standards – Recommendations for Addressing Consumer Issues). 
Since then, service standards appear each year as a key priority area of the work 
program of the COPOLCO.
So far, according to the international classification system of the UN, 27 
technical committees have been set up to develop service standards at ISO, 
46 ISO Bulletin, January 1995.
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with 348 international standards published and 193 under negotiation by 
the end of 2011.47 These are still few compared to the 220 or so technical com-
mittees and more than 19,000 international standards of the ISO. Moreover, 
standards labeled as belonging to services include domains far removed from 
what is usually understood as services, such as transport infrastructures, lab 
techniques and construction engines. The broad inclusiveness of the UN clas-
sification system shows the uncertainties in defining and classifying service 
standards, which can never be taken for granted. Yet some developments have 
taken place in domains epitomizing core intangible and relational features 
of services. This is particularly the case for professionals providing personal 
financial planning such as in pensions per capitalization (ISO 22′222:2005), 
in the vocabulary and service requirements for market, opinion and social 
research (ISO 20′252:2006), and in safety requirements for scuba diving (ISO 
24′801-1:2007), as well as a first attempt to develop a common terminology for 
defining hotels and other types of tourism accommodation (ISO 18′513:2003). 
Those distinct sectoral standards remain marginal in terms of the global service 
economy. Obviously, large parts of this economy, such as finance and insur-
ance, use instruments developed within their own sector, even if their ability to 
legitimately claim a large authority in self-regulation has been seriously chal-
lenged in the context of the global economic crisis. Cross-border service provid-
ers also rely on more generic standards, which may indifferently be applied in 
the production and exchange of goods and services. Among the most widely 
used are the quality, environmental, and information security management 
system standards ISO 9000, 14000 and 27000 series, as well as the guidance 
47 In 2011, the 25 ISO technical committees setting standards considered to belong to the service 
classification were extremely diverse as the following list indicates: TC 17 Steel; TC 28 Petroleum 
products and lubricants; TC 43 Food products; TC 68 Financial services; TC 69 Applications of 
statistical methods; TC 96 Cranes; TC 108 Mechanical vibration, shock and condition monitor-
ing; TC 127 Earth-moving machinery; TC 135 Non-destructive testing; TC 138 Plastics pipes, fit-
tings and valves for the transport of fluids; TC 176 Quality management and quality assurance; 
TC 182 Geotechnics; TC 204 Intelligent transport system; TC 210 Quality management and cor-
responding general aspects for medical devices; TC 212 Clinical laboratory testing and in vitro 
diagnostic test systems; TC 214 Elevating work platforms; TC 222 Personal Financial Planning; 
TC 223 Societal Security; TC 224 Service activities relating to drinking water supply system and 
wastewater systems; TC 225 Market, opinion and social research; TC 228 Tourism and related 
services; TC 232 Educational Services. There are also some so-called “project committees” with 
a mandate to establish only one document; see for instance: TC 235 Project Committee: Rating 
services; TC 236 Project Committee: Project Management; TC 237 Project committee: Exhibition 
terminology; TC 239 Project committee: Network services billing; TC 250 Project committee: Sus-
tainability in event management.
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on conformity assessment provided by the ISO 17000 series or the ISO 31000 
guidelines and principles of risk management.48
Within the ISO setting, the development of service standards raises chal-
lenges pertaining to their content and the distinctiveness of services as compared 
to generic management standards. The relational and immaterial features of ser-
vices prompt the development of standards that encroach simultaneously upon 
the intended quality of a service and the business operating procedures to deliver 
such a service. In the ISO, the latter is understood as a management system stand-
ard (MSS) and is kept separate from the former with dedicated procedures.49 MSS 
represents a highly sensitive field of standardization that requires a so-called 
justification study (formerly known as ISO/IEC Guide 72) and the adoption of a 
common document structure and terminology.50 Nonetheless, the distinctiveness 
of services and the desire of small and medium enterprises to refer to one single 
standard as a reference has led the ISO technical committee on tourism to send 
several requests to the ISO governing body (the Technical Management Board-
TMB) asking them to reconsider these rules. In 2012, these requests were unequiv-
ocally refused by the TMB, leading to substantial modification and adding to the 
existing delays in the development of service standards in the tourism sector.51 
Such requirements have impeded the development of service standards in many 
domains. Overcoming this difficulty will only be possible by setting standards 
according to a very narrow understanding of the procedural and generic aspects 
of services. This will make it difficult to include more substantial issues related 
to societal values and cultural contexts affecting the co-production of services.
Almost 10  years after the 2005 ISO workshop, “Global Trade in Services – 
New Challenges for International Standardization,” and two decades after the 
launch of the institutional process, progress within the ISO has been meager. 
Whereas some developments, such as those in risk management (ISO 31000) 
or energy management systems (ISO 51000), may come to have a major impact 
48 Prakash and Potoski (2006); Guler, Guillén, and Macpherson (2002); Lalonde and Boiral 
(2012).
49 See ISO/TMB Resolution 18/2012, available from:  < http://isotc.iso.org/livelink/livelink/fetch/-
15620806/15620808/15623592/15788626/TMB_Communiqué_Issue_Nr._40_%28March_2012%29.
pdf?nodeid = 15787295&vernum = -2 > . Accessed 18 October 2013.
50 The recent revision of the «ISO/IEC Directives, Part 1, Consolidated ISO Supplement – Proce-
dures specific to ISO» was precisely intended to rule and harmonize the development of manage-
ment system standards with the introduction in the annex SL of a “High level structure, identical 
core text and common terms and core definitions for use in Management Systems Standards.”
51 See ISO/TMB Resolution 17/2012, “Management Systems Standards in tourism and related 
services” available from:  < http://www.iso.org/iso/copolco_priority-programme_annual- 
report_2012.pdf > . Accessed 18 October 2013.
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on the service sector, so far, maturity in service standardization remains weak 
within the ISO environment. For instance, since the creation of the ISO commit-
tee on tourism service standards in 2005, only one out of its ten working groups 
has published standards (in the recreational diving sector; in contrast, adventure 
tourism, and natural protected areas or health tourism have hardly progressed).
6  The European setting
More developments take place at the regional level, especially in Europe with 
the European Union in the forefront of both service integration and international 
standardization.52 In 1985, Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 on a “New Approach” to 
technical harmonization and standardization instigated a completely new regu-
latory technique and strategy.53 The resolution was a response to the growing role 
of the European Court of Justice in resolving conflicts on regulatory policies in the 
internal European market, especially since the 1979 Cassis de Dijon case secur-
ing the principle of mutual recognition in the absence of harmonized legislation 
or technical standards. It was also an early move towards the completion of the 
Single Market by devising procedures to avoid turning technical specifications 
into structural impediments to trade. Although member states were suspicious 
about seeing regulation in this domain transferred to the European authorities, 
they did perceive the threat of a race to the bottom in public purpose standards 
as market integration progressed. The New Approach provides a framework for 
the harmonization of EU public law only on the general and essential require-
ments of goods traded on the European market, in particular in the fields of 
health, environment, safety, and consumer protection. Depending on the sectors 
affected, technical specifications, performance criteria and quality requirements 
are either based on mutual recognition of national standards, or delegated to 
European standard-setting bodies. In most sectors, the procedure for monitor-
ing standards is a matter of business self-regulation, since products put on the 
market are granted a presumption of conformity, solely based on the declaration 
of the manufacturer (CE marking). Thus, the European New Approach has done 
52 There are regional standardization bodies, most notably in the Americas (Pan American 
Standards Commission, COPANT and Asociación Mercosur de Normalización, AMN) and in Asia-
Pacific (Pacific Area Standards Congress, PASC) and in Africa (African Regional Organization for 
Standardization, ARSO). As compared to the European system, however, their influence is still 
weak.
53 For a discussion of the increasing reliance on standardization in European law making and 
public policy from a legal pluralism approach, see: Joerges, Ladeur, and Ellen (1999).
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more than strengthen the importance of voluntary standards in the Single Market. 
By avoiding costly third party testing and certification, and providing the proce-
dural means for a simultaneous adoption of European standards as international 
ones (through the so-called Dresden and Vienna Agreements), the EU has also 
included third countries in its standardization system. The (largely unintended) 
outcome has been a powerful strategic positioning of European standards in the 
global market.54
The European Commission was well aware that the emergence of an increas-
ingly dense and extensive European standardization complex with global reach 
could also support the 2000 Lisbon Agenda. Services were a core feature of the 
plan “to become the most competitive and dynamic knowledge-based economy 
in the world.” New emphasis on service standards occurred after the 2005 mid-
term review of the Lisbon Agenda and adoption of Directive 2006/123/EC on ser-
vices in the Internal Market, the so-called Bolkestein Directive eventually agreed 
to on second reading in December 2006 and fully implemented since the end of 
2009. A horizontal approach to regulatory harmonization supposedly valid for 
any kind of service provision at the European level lies at the center of the direc-
tive. The controversial “country of origin” principle has been substituted for the 
formula “freedom to provide services” in order to ensure conformity with regula-
tions of the place of delivery. Yet, the Directive emphasizes that the promotion 
of quality is a crucial issue for the unification of the internal market for services. 
To this end, it explicitly encourages professional independent associations and 
standard-development and certification bodies (like the CEN, CENELEC, or ETSI) 
to develop voluntary quality marks and labels (preamble 102 and article 26).
Actually, DG Enterprise and Industry of the European Commission already 
addressed in 2003 a first programming mandate (M 340) to CEN, CENELEC and 
ETSI in the field of services to identify priority sectors of intra-community trade 
in services. Issues could include horizontal cross-sectoral generic standards 
and vertical sector-specific standards, as well as service providers or end-users. 
A second programming mandate (M 371) was addressed to CEN in the field of 
services in 2005 following the transfer of responsibility for business related ser-
vices to DG Internal Market and Services. Half a dozen European standardization 
bodies developed eleven projects accordingly.
The CEN Horizontal European Service Standardization Strategy (CHESSS) 
is the largest project responding to EU Mandate M/371. It includes a consortium 
of national standards bodies led by the British Standards Institution (BSI), with 
those from Spain (AENOR), Germany (DIN), Denmark (DS), Estonia (EVS) and the 
54 Vogel (1995); Egan (2001).
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Netherlands (NEN), as well as CapGemini, one of the world leaders in IT services 
consulting and management. Its final report published in 2009 examined the fea-
sibility of a generic approach to European service standardization across multiple 
service sectors, as opposed to following a sector-specific approach.55 The CHESSS 
project has raised crucial issues on the distinctiveness of service standards, antici-
pating the ISO TMB decision specifying the content of service standards and what 
can be standardized in the service sector. The importance of quality in services 
has inevitably led to questioning their specificity with regard to quality manage-
ment standards (i.e., ISO 9000 series). One module of the project claims that 
service standards are not about the “how” but about the “what,” i.e., a service 
standard is not about how to achieve a goal, as with management standards, but 
specifies the goal to be achieved and the means for assessing its achievement.56 In 
this regard, the proposal to develop a customer satisfaction index is undoubtedly 
as crucial in framing conformity assessment procedures in services as weights 
and measures underpinning similar procedures for products. The distinctiveness 
of service standards is that they extend beyond procedural issues to cover such 
issues as common writing models and the terminology employed across the entire 
service sector. The CHESSS project clearly aims at ensuring that service standards 
establish their distinctiveness in the realm of standardization, as management or 
performance standards did previously.
What can be standardized is closely related to the institutional environment 
in which standards for the service sector are developed. Unsurprisingly, the 
CHESSS report points out the difficulty of involving stakeholders in the develop-
ment of generic standards when most of them lack the necessary awareness and 
resources. Throughout the modules, significant differences exist regarding the 
approach to what can be standardized: some favor multiple horizontal standards 
as opposed to a single horizontal one; others prefer horizontal standards com-
pleted by vertical standards, while still others remain skeptical about the capac-
ity of any generic standards to deal with the distinctiveness and diversity of the 
service economy. The difficulty of stakeholders’ involvement has cast doubts on 
the institutional structures for setting service standards. For some, the current 
system is as appropriate for services as for products. In contrast, B2B services are 
seen as a good case for a new system based on a dual representation with stake-
holders besides conventional national bodies, such as European organizations 
representing industry, SMEs and consumers: “This double representation system 
ensures a balanced representation of sectors on the one hand and of national 
55 CHESSS (2009a).
56 CHESSS (2009b: p. 109).
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interest on the other hand.”57 It remains unclear whether the CHESSS strategy 
will be successful; while only one recommendation of the CHESSS project has 
currently been implemented,58 the interest in a single horizontal generic standard 
with a certification scheme is clearly an attempt to promote service standards on 
a par with the worldwide achievement of the ISO 9000 series. Thus, the important 
role of the European Commission in supporting standardization for the service 
sector may not only reinforce endogenous recognition of service standards. It 
could also pave the way for the deterritorialization of regulatory practices through 
greater reliance on market mechanisms for the diffusion of such standards.
In contrast, the ten other projects responding to EU Mandate M/371 address 
the specificity of distinct service markets. Afnor, the French national standardiza-
tion body, a pioneer in setting national standards in well-defined service sectors, 
initiated those projects in consultation with some European partners, in particu-
lar from the Netherlands and Denmark. The recommendations identify a number 
of service activities likely to be standardized at various levels, whether European 
Standards per se, or at a lower level, guidance materials and so-called workshop 
agreements.59 The advantage of a vertical and sectoral approach is largely seen 
in the quality of the deliberation process, which is likely to better address the 
distinctiveness of services in sectors of highly relational and immaterial activi-
ties. According to Pascal Gautier, in charge of the Management and Services Unit 
at Afnor, generic standards in services would soon become burdensome and 
unrealistic as “they require phenomenal efforts which would eventually gen-
erate opposition;” in his view, “it is much better to favor a niche approach in 
service standards so as to keep a sector-specific proximity, i.e., to choose a so-
called Swiss army knife effect where each blade has its distinct use.”60 However, 
the ambiguous mixture of private and public actors involved in standardization 
processes favored by this approach remains important. Similarly, the issues 
concerned do not clearly distinguish between societal or more strictly technical 
57 CHESSS (2009c: p. 223).
58 A guidance document for drafting service standards was published by CEN in 2012, “CEN 
Guide 15, guidance document for the development of service standards.” Available from:  < ftp://
ftp.cen.eu/BOSS/Reference_Documents/Guides/CEN/CEN_15.pdf > . Accessed 16 October 2013.
59 CEN/CEN Management Centre, Summary, Background and Proposals related to European 
Commission Programming Mandate M/371 in the Field of Services n.d. April 2009. According to 
the report, standardization work should be initiated in the following areas: accessibility of trans-
port and tourist services, project management services in the field of engineering consultancy, 
services for residential homes and older persons, reception services, IT- and non-IT service out-
sourcing, and smart house services.
60 Author’s interview with Pascal Gautier, Head of the Management and Services Unit, Afnor, 
Paris, 18 April 2007.
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objects of reference. A proper differentiation of actors among stakeholders and 
issues spanning physical measure to societal values, as well as clear-cut incen-
tives to mitigate representation biases, would be necessary to ensure a fair, sub-
stantial and thorough representation in standardization processes.
Faced with the faster development of service standards at the national rather 
than at the European level,61 and the potential creation of barriers to intra-EU trade 
in services, the Commission initiated a reform of the European standardization 
system, known as the “standardization package.”62 One of its key objectives was 
to establish a better inclusion of service standards in the regulatory framework. 
Despite opposing views of what can be standardized in services, the consulta-
tion organized in 2010–2011 led to strong support for including service standards 
and keeping the principle of national delegation in this domain.63 As such, the 
entry came into force in 2013 of the new regulation on European standardization 
(1025/2012), which extends the New Approach to services and constrains European 
National Standards Boards (NSBs) to notify services standardization activities, 
permits the takeover of their further development at the European level. Moreover, 
the new regulation reinforces the support granted to European stakeholders and 
SMEs. Nonetheless, the new regulatory framework has not necessarily diminished 
the divide opposing supporters of vertical sector-specific standards such as Afnor 
and horizontal cross-sectoral generic standards such as those promoted by the 
British Standards Institution (BSI). This probably explains the mid-range strategy 
pursued by the European Commission in addressing Mandate M/517 in January 
2013 to the CEN, CENELEC and ETSI for the development of “horizontal service 
standards.” While fostering the standardization of the generic attributes of ser-
vices, the mandate emphasizes the development of “ ‘narrower’ horizontal service 
standards for particular aspects/parts of a full service provision” as opposed to a 
single, all-inclusive horizontal service standard.
61 See for instance COM 2011(311) Final: “Progress in the development of European standards for 
services has, however, been slow and recent years have seen the rapid growth in service stand-
ards at the national rather than the European level, (453 new national standards in 2005–2009, 
as opposed to only 24 European).”
62 In particular, the standardization package integrates Directive 98/34/CE of the European Par-
liament and of the Council regarding the “procedure for the provision of information in the field 
of technical standards and regulations and of rules on Information Society services” (22 June 
1998) and the Decision 1673/2006/CE of the European Parliament and of the Council on the fi-
nancing of European standardization (24 October 2006).
63 See:  < http://ec.europa.eu/enterprise/policies/european-standards/standardisation-policy/
policy-review/results-public-consultation_en.htm > . Accessed 12 April 2012. Documents adopted 
in June 2011 by the European Commission are the following: Communication on a strategic vision 
for European standards – COM (2011) 311; Proposal for a Regulation on European Standardization 
– COM(2011)315.
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7  The American setting
With European standardization processes usually seen as driven by a coherent and 
centralized institutional framework in opposition to the fragmented and decen-
tralized American system, the overall design of international standardization 
remains unsurprisingly disputed. In Mattli’s words, “the disagreement between 
Europeans and Americans is about whether an international standard is simply 
one that benefits from de facto or de jure international acceptance and use by an 
industry, or whether it must come from an organization that is truly international 
in the sense that it has an international representation of national members and 
an international voting structure based on those national members. A resolution 
of this disagreement is not in sight; it will require, among other things, a clearer 
understanding of the relationship between national, regional and international 
standardization organizations.”64 Despite a number of noticeable differences 
between the American and European system, several features do contribute to 
bridging the conventional gap of such a transatlantic divide.
First, the American National Standards Institute (ANSI), a strictly not-for-
profit private organization, plays a significant role in centralizing standardization 
processes. Its mandate explicitly places ANSI in charge of the coordination and 
representation of US interests at the ISO and IEC. ANSI also plays a crucial role 
in enhancing the coherence of standard-setting processes both within the US and 
amongst US participants in international arenas. Without developing standards, 
it coordinates and accredits US-based SDOs, which in turn must comply with the 
ANSI essential requirements for standards development processes. In fact, the 
Vice President of International Policy of ANSI contests the depiction of the Ameri-
can standardization processes as fragmented and decentralized as, instead, they 
take place in an “organized distributed system.”65 This particular account of the 
American setting presents ANSI’s coordination role in a positive light, but also 
reflects the delineated environment in which US standardization takes place. 
While ANSI is responsible for the coordination of over 200 accredited SDOs, the 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) is the federal agency that 
fulfills a similar role at the level of governmental agencies. Over the last decade, 
the 1996 National Technology Transfer and Advancement Act and the 1998 revi-
sion of the Circular A-119 of the Office of Management and Budget have played 
a significant role in enhancing NIST’s profile; those pieces of legislation and 
regulation entrust NIST with promoting the use of voluntary standards in lieu of 
64 Mattli (2001: p. 330).
65 Author’s interview with Gary Kushnier, Vice-President for international policy, ANSI, Wash-
ington D.C., 7 August 2009.
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government unique standards within federal agencies. In 2009 alone, over 3300 
employees in 25 federal agencies contributed to the development of voluntary 
standards in nearly 500 formal and informal SDOs.66 At the same time, over 400 
NIST employees have taken part in standards development processes in about 
1400 technical committees of formal and informal SDOs.67 The direct involvement 
of governmental agencies is only part of the relationship between public authori-
ties and standardization. More than 8600 standards are referred to in US law, 
and over 10,500 in public procurement procedures. It is also worth noting that 
ANSI Steering Committee not only includes representatives of industry and civil 
society, but also a number of government agencies.68 In this sense, the American 
setting relies on a mix of public and private actors.
While the American institutional setting is not as dissimilar to the European 
and ISO framework as conventionally understood, current developments in the 
distinct domain of service standards remain sharply dissimilar across the Atlan-
tic. Services are for the most part non-existent on the agenda of American SDOs. 
Even the largest standard-setters pay scant attention to how services may chal-
lenge the future of standardization. In 2009, the strategic plans of the Board of 
Directors of the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME) focused on 
nuclear and renewable energies, the development of the engineering workforce 
and globalization.69 As Bernard Hrubala, Vice-President of ASME and Division 
Manager at TÜV Rheinland put it, “our ultimate goal at the end of the day is, 
don’t matter what the standard is in every country, we want their standards to be 
consistent with the ASME standards.”70 Yet none of these activities specifically 
focuses on services. While ASTM International (originally known as the Ameri-
can Society for Testing and Materials) shares this claim to play a leadership role 
at the global level with an active policy of memoranda of understanding signed 
with over sixty national SDOs, it ignores the issue of service standards and prefers 
66 NIST (2010).
67 NIST (2009).
68 Represented governmental agencies include among others: Environmental Protection Agen-
cy, Food and Drug Administration, Department of Defense; industry members include among 
others: Motorola, IBM, Rockwell Automation, and Boeing; SDOs include among others: Institute 
of Electrical and Electronics Engineers, ASTM International, ASME, Underwriters Laboratories; 
civil society representatives include among others the National Consumer League and Consum-
ers Union.
69 Authors’ interview with William Berger, Managing Director, ASME, and Bernard E. Hrubala, 
Sr. Vice President, ASME, and Division Manager of the Industrial Services Unit, TÜV Rheinland, 
New-York, 18 August 2009.
70 Authors’ interview with Bernard E. Hrubala, Sr. Vice President, ASME, and Division Manager 
of unit ‘Industrial Services’, TÜV Rheinland, New-York, 18 August 2009.
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to give prime importance to sustainability. It is from this standpoint that ASTM 
International plans to revise most existing standards and chart new activities 
such as carbon footprint and alternative fuels. Katharine E. Morgan, ASTM Vice-
President of the Technical Committee Operations, goes to great lengths to explain 
this strategic shift: “We are seeing green, from roofing to isolation to degradable 
plastics, we are seeing that across a lot of our committees.”71 For its part, NIST 
sees its role in service standardization closely related to strategic issues set by 
the Obama administration in domains such as smart grid standards, healthcare 
IT standards and security standards (including “preparedness” and “business 
continuity”) initiated by the Department of Homeland Security.72 Finally, ANSI 
considers that abiding by its coordination mandate is at odds with setting any 
priority at all as long as its members have not done so – this de facto excludes 
service standards among potential hot topics.73
Officials in charge of standardization strategy in the major bodies of the 
American institutional setting invariably explain the lack of concern over service 
standards by a lack of demand. All our interviewees confirmed that service stand-
ards are not part of their strategic standardization activities. Interestingly, the 
few service standards dealt with among American SDOs are confined to domestic 
issues. For instance, the development of a standard for site assessments merely 
responds to a requirement set by the US Environmental Protection Agency.74 
Overall, standardization in services does not lie at the heart of our interview-
ees’ preoccupations: “ASTM doesn’t take a position with evaluating those… we 
would let those industries just go and do their participation in ISO on that.”75 
Or in ASME words: “Our scope is essentially mechanical engineering. Those ser-
vices type things don’t really fall within our area.”76 ANSI claims more support, 
but also calls to mind the warning given to ISO against a premature venture into 
all sorts of service areas, most notably because of the lack of industry support.77 
71 Authors’ interview with Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President, Technical Committee Opera-
tions, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009.
72 Authors’ interview with Belinda Lowenhaupt Collins, Director for Technology Services, NIST, 
Gaithersburg, 3 August 2009.
73 Authors’ interview with Gary Kushnier, Vice-President for International Policy, ANSI, inter-
view with the authors, Washington D.C., 7 August 2009.
74 Authors’ interview with Katharine E. Morgan, Vice President, Technical Committee Opera-
tions, ASTM International, West Conshohocken, 19 August 2009.
75 Idem.
76 Authors’ interview with William Berger, Managing Director, Asme, and Bernard E. Hrubala, 
Sr. Vice President, ASME, and Division Manager of the Industrial Services Unit, TÜV Rheinland, 
New-York, 18 August 2009.
77 Authors’ interview with Gary Kushnier, Vice-President for International Policy, ANSI, Wash-
ington D.C., 7 August 2009.
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Accordingly, supporting either horizontal cross-sectoral generic standards or 
vertical sector-specific standards is seen as merely of pragmatic concerns and 
disconnected from a supposedly service distinctiveness. In ANSI’s words: “We 
don’t prefer one over the other, it’s what is needed.”78 Yet, more broadly, generic 
standards raise the issue of certification. American SDOs remain highly critical 
of standards likely to be used for certification purposes. Taking the example of 
the ISO 9000, ANSI emphasizes the lack of added value brought by certification: 
“It didn’t add value if you are a large company and you already have an excellent 
quality management system. What does it bring to spend a few more millions of 
dollars or euros to get certified to something you do better already?”79
8   Service standards and institutional 
ambivalences
What kind of transnational authority can be assumed with regard to the ongoing 
processes taking place in the domain of service standardization in the ISO, Euro-
pean, and American contexts? How do these multiple authorities of standards 
reflect a special case concerning the domain of services? Our discussion focuses 
on how the above-mentioned developments matter in assessing the authority of 
international standards in the service sector along the three core dimensions of 
the agents involved, the issues concerned, and the space in which such stand-
ardization processes are likely to be recognized.
Regarding actors involved in the standardization of services, this paper pro-
vides strong evidence of the significance of public support, in particular within 
European institutions. However, the difficulties of the CHESSS project shed light 
on a common feature on both sides of the Atlantic as well as within the ISO 
context: the support and expertise of private actors is crucial in the development 
of standards. The low level of involvement in the field of service standards in the 
US mirrors the difficulty of European and ISO projects in convincing stakeholders 
from the private sector. This suggests that behind labels of “direct participation” in 
the US and “national delegation” for the European and ISO setting, actors setting 
standards are the same: large firms dominate technical committees, with govern-
ment agencies attempting in some cases to take part in drafting standards, and 
not-for-profit associations from civil society remain largely under-represented. In 
contrast to the direct political influence of the European setting, the American 
78 Idem.
79 Idem.
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system relies on the indirect influence of the legal and regulatory environment 
supporting and legitimizing the output of formal and informal SDOs. Thus, far 
from mere fragmentation, the US system hinges upon double coordination mech-
anisms, ensured by ANSI at the level of formal SDOs and by NIST with regard to 
governmental agencies. The distinction between national delegation and direct 
participation therefore appears to be more relevant for describing the space of 
standards recognition outside the US than the type of actors involved within the 
US. Finally, the difficulties experienced by the European CHESSS project sheds 
light on the importance of enrolling private actors for support and expertise on 
both sides of the Atlantic. The lack of distinct service standardization processes 
in the US here echoes the difficulty in encouraging stakeholder involvement in 
European projects to develop standards in conjunction with the unification of the 
market for services. Apparently European officials have greater influence on the 
issues put on the agenda than do private actors likely to shore up the processes of 
setting new service standards.
Regarding the objects concerned, the potential scope of international stand-
ardization in the domain of services differs greatly across the Atlantic. The antag-
onism between horizontal and vertical standards reflects the struggles at stake 
in defining what should be standardized in services: should it be the generic 
attributes of technical interfaces supporting the interaction between providers 
and customers on a horizontal basis for the widest range of services (information 
requirements, billing, complaint handling, etc.)? Or should technical specifica-
tions be more substantial on a narrower sectoral basis, defining how services can 
be co-produced and used on a reliable basis with shared expectations regarding 
their quality? Services’ distinctiveness is clearly at stake here, with an assump-
tion that the more intangible and relational the service is, the more difficult to 
measure and standardize. Yet this does not mean it is impossible. In spite of all 
its flaws, the European CHESSS project has provided a significant step in build-
ing a coherent framework for the standardization of services. The development of 
a customer satisfaction index tailored for services may eventually overcome the 
controversy between vertical and horizontal service standards. Devised to gauge 
the quality of services, the index could provide evidence of a positive impact of a 
standard on customer satisfaction, be it horizontal or vertical. Finally, it is worth 
noting that the case of energy and smart metering suggests that societal issues 
are likely to be greater in Europe than in the US, where the focus is on narrower 
technical and market-driven aspects. While both sides demonstrate interest on 
the issue, American stakeholders narrow it down to technical issues associated 
with the physical characteristics of the resources delivered by such services. In 
contrast, the CHESSS project explicitly pointed out broader concerns of sustain-
able development.
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Thus, what can be standardized in the domain of services relates to a wider 
set of issues in Europe than in the US. While the intangible and relational nature 
of a number of services is often viewed as a major hindrance to standardization, 
standards can be instrumental in the development of technical interfaces to 
industrialize the provision of services and the promotion of stereotyped behav-
iors denying the specificity of the service relationship. Decision trees in offshore 
contact centers and quality and security requirements in data transfer and pro-
cessing services are examples. Yet, a more progressive response in setting stand-
ardized behaviors in service deliveries across borders can also include broader 
societal concerns and suppose a greater involvement of service providers and 
beneficiaries alike in responding to increasing doubts on the misuse of services. 
Consequently, standards play a significant role in creating new markets, with 
varying emphasis on narrow market requirements or broader societal concerns. 
In both cases, however, strong public support represents a driving force behind 
SDOs’ agendas. The standardization of services in Europe has its roots in man-
dates of the Commission and underlines a strong (inter-)governmental concern 
on the instrumental role of standards in building a single market for services. 
In contrast, a single market for services already exists for most domains in the 
US. As a result, the demand for new service standards is low. It is worth noting 
that the few activities related to service standards in the US specifically target 
the domestic market. Thus, despite the different position of services on the Euro-
pean and American standardization agendas, service standards are in both cases 
related to the construction and maintenance of their respective internal market. 
While this provides support to Egan’s claim about the role of standards in the 
construction of American and European markets, it also sheds light on the on-
going difficulties of boosting the development of international service standards 
with a truly global relevance within the ISO setting.80
This brings us to the third dimension defining the transnational hybrid 
authority of standards: the extent of the space in which technical specifications 
in the domain of services are likely to be defined, distributed and recognized 
across sovereign states. International standards compete in terms of their differ-
ent sources of legitimacy, as well as their various modes of cooperation. Market 
adoption is the main source of legitimacy for standards developed by American 
SDOs. This means that the recognition of standards beyond the sovereign space 
of the US primarily relies on the exogenous process of market mechanisms – a 
good entry point into new markets as expressed by one interviewee. The transla-
tion of standards into official languages of various countries and the organiza-
tion of training workshops tailored to the distinct needs of well-chosen countries 
80 Egan (2001: pp. 33–38).
Beyond the transatlantic divide      143
are an integral part of this strategy. This does not mean, however, that American 
SDOs overlook the legitimacy of their standards based on direct participation. 
The ASTM Memoranda of Understanding signed by numerous national stand-
ards bodies strongly echoes the principle of national delegation in use at the CEN 
and ISO, even if they are part of a contractual and bilateral strategy. In contrast, 
the legitimacy of standards in Europe endorses the principle of national delega-
tion. The diffusion and adoption of standards is consistent with the endogenous 
logic of territorial sovereignty. However, current plans in the domain of services 
may lead to a dual model, in which direct participation would complement the 
national delegation model. This is what would follow from the double repre-
sentation system suggested by one module of the CHESSS project. It was also 
thoroughly discussed in the consultation process preceding the adoption of the 
reform of the European standardization system (Regulation 1025/2012). However, 
one should be aware that this would rely more upon the involvement of stake-
holders within the European context than the broadening of standard recognition 
beyond the confine of the EU. This falls short of defining a dedicated procedure 
for setting future service standards.
Finally, the certification of a hypothetical European horizontal service stand-
ard is likely to become a contentious issue between the US and Europe. Ameri-
cans oppose certification on grounds of a lack of added value to a company. In 
Europe, in contrast, certification is justified by its contribution to market trans-
parency which is likely to foster intra-European trade in services. Here again, the 
opposition between Europe and the US reflects divergent market structures. Cer-
tification bodies offering conformity assessment can easily be seen as undermin-
ing shareholder value in an already unified market such as in the US. In contrast, 
when market creation objectives are at stake, as in the case of the Single Euro-
pean Market for services, certification procedures expected to enhance trust in 
the market can, understandably, relate more directly to the realization of this aim.
9  Conclusions
This paper has engaged the plurality of institutional environments in the world 
of standards by studying the case of service standards in the context of the ISO, 
European, and American standardization systems. In contrast to conventional 
views, the theoretical approach underlying our analysis aims at questioning the 
distinctiveness of the institutional embeddedness of standard-setting develop-
ments, as well as the variance between service and product standards. Our frame-
work suggests three dimensions according to which we can examine our case: 
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the actors of standardization – i.e., who has the authority to set standards; the 
objects – i.e., what is standardized; and the space of recognition – i.e., where and 
from where standards can be implemented and viewed as legitimate.
Our results shed light on the extent to which public and private actors overlap 
in the standardization arenas on both sides of the Atlantic, as well as on the inter-
national plane of the ISO system. The level of public involvement required to 
engage private actors in setting standards supporting market access for new lines 
of services bolsters the case for service specificity. Yet, the assumption that such 
specificity would call for reforming existing models of representation in stand-
ardization bodies has so far only been contemplated in the European context – an 
observation that provides in return some support to the argument of an insti-
tutional distinctiveness along which situating the Atlantic divide. Closer atten-
tion to the object of standardization underlines the uncertainty and on-going 
struggles surrounding the specific features of service standards. In contrast to an 
American context less apprehensive of such concerns, the emphasis on service 
specificity in the European context is more susceptible to disputes over what 
can be standardized. A significant issue in this regard is the opposition between 
advocates of so-called horizontal generic standards, supposedly valid for any 
kind of service provision, and those in favor of so-called vertical standards apply-
ing more narrowly defined specifications for distinct industries or processes. The 
American disregard for service specificity could be attuned to supporters of hori-
zontal generic standards and therefore contribute to undermining the so-called 
transatlantic divide. Finally, regarding the space of standards’ recognition, future 
developments in service standards are likely to reinforce the deterritorialization 
of regulatory practices. Our results provide evidence for a nuanced understand-
ing of this buzzword used in many studies of globalization. Whilst the wider 
spatial recognition of US based standards primarily relies on market mechanisms 
involving global market forces to some extent, the American setting also includes 
territorially-based legitimacy processes, such as the involvement of non-US SDOs 
in standard development processes. Similarly, opposing views on the range of 
recognition for future service standards developed within the European and ISO 
settings are likely to generate various compromises around complex models, 
where market- and territorially-based systems would considerably overlap. While 
these findings tend to blur the conventional image of a transatlantic divide in 
standardization, the support granted to European stakeholders and SMEs within 
the new European standardization regulatory framework arguably lends support 
to the service specificity thesis. More generally, the picture emerging from the 
on-going institutional developments at the European, American, and worldwide 
ISO levels suggests that the transnational hybrid authority of international stand-
ards in the service sector will have a growing, yet differentiated influence on the 
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regulatory environment of the economy and society at large. Nevertheless, over 
the last few years, such developments have been weaker than expected.
A first lesson to be drawn from our findings is that multiple authorities of 
service standards seem to follow competing models that do not strictly repro-
duce the conventional understanding of standardization systems. The two sets 
of competing profiles among states and non-state actors conferring authority 
on service standards are the following. The first favors horizontal standards for 
generic specifications that would cut across distinct sectors and reinforce the 
power of transnational markets thanks to narrow definitions of requirements 
such as transparency and quality. In contrast, the second supports vertical 
standards according to which the internationalization of the service economy 
would remain rooted in concrete market practices, labor processes, and, argu-
ably, society at large. From this perspective, services can only be standardized 
according to the specificity of the configuration in which they are provided and 
the context of their usage. While the motto of the first view is what Ziva Patir, 
former Vice President of the ISO, calls the 1-1-1-dream of “one market, one stand-
ard, one test, globally accepted,”81 the second is more inclined to restrict such a 
motto to “one sector, one standard, one test, accepted wherever relevant.” These 
conflicting claims reflect opposing types of relationships between standards and 
society at large. International standards can be used either as driving forces for 
broadening the domain of market self-regulation, or as alternate instruments for 
embedding markets within society. The direction on which the balance will tilt 
depends on the degree to which society is fairly, substantially and thoroughly 
included in standardization processes; it is also subject to the differentiation of 
issues likely to be appropriate for such alternate tools of market organization. 
Accordingly, the institutional developments of service standards are likely to face 
trade-offs between promoters of further socialization of international standards 
applied to distinct and well-chosen service sectors and the advocates of a com-
modification of technical standards. The former will be content with a transfer of 
the universal scope of law into a catalog of sectoral service standards developed 
by official standard-setting bodies backed by WTO/GATS provisions. In contrast, 
the latter will struggle for a worldwide recognition of minimal generic market-
based standards, such as quality management and security standards provided 
by consultancy firms and consortia fiercely competing on the lucrative market of 
management methodologies and certification of business processes.
The second lesson is that such a more nuanced view on the conventional dis-
tinction between the so-called European and American standardization systems 
can be explained by the special case of services. It is on the definition of what 
81 Authors’ interview with Ziva Patir, former ISO Vice President, Geneva, 8 June 2007.
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exactly a service standard is that the two systems differ most widely. American 
practitioners tend to deny the distinctiveness of service standards, in sharp con-
trast to the European context where on-going struggles take place to define what 
exactly this category may mean. In this regard, how should we explain the weaker 
than expected development of service standards in Europe? Is it further evidence 
of hindrances resulting from service specificity? Or are we subject to a fallacy of 
composition in inferring a weak development of service standards, when many 
international standards are developed elsewhere, whether or not tagged “service-
related” as we observed in the US? As we saw, smart metering could be a fruitful 
area for future research on this issue. A further implication of our study is how the 
object of standardization affects, in turn, the institutional environment in which 
it is likely to take place. This is particularly the case within the European context 
which is so eager to build a coherent framework for the standardization of ser-
vices. This sets the agenda for examining other ambiguous and neglected aspects 
of the transnational hybrid authority of standards.
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